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INTRODUCTION
English company law recognises three basic categories of director: de jure directors who have been properly appointed, de facto directors who act as directors despite their lack of appointment and shadow directors, who exercise indirect control over the company by issuing instructions to obedient de jure directors. Given the pivotal role played by company directors in relation to corporate governance, it is vital that the power wielded by all types of directors is subject to regulation via the or equitable principles so apply '. 11 Consequently, the application of the general directors duties to shadow directors by the courts is not a matter of statutory interpretation, but instead an application of the equitable principles relating to fiduciary obligations. Given that almost all of the general directors' duties are probably fiduciary in nature, with the exception of the codification of negligence under the duty to 'exercise reasonable, care, skill and diligence', 12 the key question is whether the application of general equitable principles results in shadow directors owing fiduciary duties to the relevant company.
The identification of fiduciaries in English law rests primarily on the presence of one of the previouslyestablished settled categories of fiduciary relationship (the status or relationship-based fiduciary) and, unlike de jure and de facto directors, the relationship between a shadow director and a company has yet to become settled. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the term 'shadow director' was first used as short-hand for the definition in the Companies Act 1980, 13 despite the concept itself having existed for nearly a century. 14 Outside of the accepted categories of fiduciary relationships, fiduciary duties are also recognised on an individual factual basis, when an individual makes an express or implied undertaking to act as a fiduciary (fact-based fiduciaries). This so called 'undertaking' test has also been deployed to determine whether the shadow director-company relationship is generally fiduciary in nature. The first part of this paper will demonstrate that, as evidenced by an analysis of the English cases of Yukong Line, 15 Ultraframe 16 and Vivendi SA v Richards, 17 that the 'undertaking test' alone is an inadequate basis for determining whether fiduciary duties ought to apply to shadow directors.
Furthermore, it will also be argued that the justifications offered thus far by the courts to supplement the 'undertaking test', are practically and theoretically flawed. These arguments will be made by first defining the shadow director concept, before considering the theoretical basis for imposing fiduciary duties, followed by a critical examination of the 'undertaking test' both theoretically and in its practical application to shadow directors by the English courts.
The second part of this paper will argue that the Canadian 'power and discretion' test should also be deployed to provide a principled justification, for demonstrating that shadow directors ought to owe fiduciary duties to the company. The 'fiduciary powers theory' of Paul Miller 18 will be used to justify the application of the 'power and discretion test', and to argue that fiduciary relationships can be justified without resorting to wider legal, moral or public policy justifications. The application of the 'power and discretion' test in Canada will also be examined, both generally, and in terms of a potential application to shadow directors. Finally, it will argued that both the 'undertaking test' and 'power and discretion test', should be applied as part of a wider process for identifying shadow directors as fiduciaries.
SHADOW DIRECTORS 15 20 Morritt LJ emphasised that whilst a shadow director may frequently lurk in the shadows, this is not a required attribute of a shadow director. The judge also identified that influence did not need to be exercised over the entire field of corporate activities, and whilst it is sufficient to show that the de jure directors cast themselves in a subservient role, there was no requirement to demonstrate that they had done this in all circumstances. The court also highlighted that it was dangerous to use epithets to describe the board, such as 'cat's paw, puppet or dancer to the tune of the shadow director', given that this suggested a greater degree of control then the statutory definition actually required.
Yukong Line of Korea Ltd v Rendsburg Corp Investments of Liberia Inc
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However, it seems that in Deverell that the notion of 'accustomed to act' from CA 2006, s 251 was somewhat under-played, given that earlier cases had found that control of the board, or at least a majority of the board, was needed in order for an individual to become a shadow director.
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Subsequent case law, 23 and indeed the important later case of Ultraframe, has also suggested that control of the board is needed, given that the underlying policy ground of the statute was to ensure that those who effectively control the activities of a company be subject to the same statutory liabilities as a de jure director. 24 Hence, the shadow director is a powerful controlling figure within the unofficial hierarchy of the company concerned, and would seem to be a prime candidate for possessing fiduciary duties to the company. 
FIDUCIARY THEORY
Prior to examining the judicial approach to the application of fiduciary duties to shadow directors, it is first useful to briefly identify the theoretical arguments that have developed regarding the nature of fiduciary duties. 25 Several possible justifications for fiduciary duties will be identified, 26 to facilitate the later theoretical contextualisation of a number of judicial decisions relating to the fiduciary duties of shadow directors. The key problem is that historically judges were prepared to, and to some extent still do, impose fiduciary duties between individuals providing a relevant relationship could be found, without explaining why such a relationship is deemed to be fiduciary in nature. 27 In order to fill the gap created by the courts, a number of theoretical justifications have subsequently been provided by academics for justifying the application of these duties. 39 The potential for a public policy justification is discussed in relation to the Vivendi case.
other ends based upon 'a legal principle or a consideration peculiar to legal institutions or the integrity of law.' 40 Conversely, juridical justifications accept that fiduciary duties are unique, and can be justified based upon the formal characteristics of the fiduciary relationship itself. 41 This category provides a justification for the Canadian 'power and discretion test', via Paul Miller's 'fiduciary powers theory'
for justifying fiduciary relationships. 42 Whilst a definitive theoretical justification cannot be provided for Paul Miller's theory, it is nevertheless argued that the theory does provide a sound justification for adopting the 'power and discretion' test alongside the 'undertaking test'. This is particularly pertinent given the difficulties suffered by the English courts in identifying whether shadow directors ought to be fiduciaries using the 'undertaking' test alone, as the next two sections will demonstrate.
THE ORIGINAL 'UNDERTAKING' TEST
Whilst a number of early cases posited a property-based justification for fiduciary duties, 43 49 Millet LJ at p 18 stated, 'The concept encaptures a situation where one person is in a relationship with another which gives rise to a legitimate expectation, which equity will recognise, that the fiduciary will not utilise his or her position in such a way which is adverse to the interests of the principal'. 50 However, Finn's maintains that the fiduciary principle is an instrument of public policy, deployed 'to maintain the integrity, credibility and utility of relationships perceived to be of importance in society,'
as well as protecting personal and economic interests. 76 The problem is that, as Miller identifies, whilst
Finn emphasises the public importance of certain fiduciary relationships, he still provides no clear policy justification for fiduciary duties in general. 77 In any case, regardless of which of these theoretical approaches is deployed, all accept that fiduciary duties can be imposed by the courts beyond those shadow directors are fiduciaries, 93 and also deployed a public policy justification, the majority of the justifications he provided were analogies between shadow directors and other established fiduciary relationships. He suggested that shadow directors are similar to promoters, in the sense that both can use powers which 'greatly affects the interest of the corporation', 94 and to de facto directors in that 'a shadow director's role in company may be every bit as important as that of a de facto director'.
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The problem with analogies is that these often emerge when there is a 'perceived need' to identify a relationship as fiduciary, yet often there is a lack of clear principles guiding the analogical approach.
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Whilst analogies may be useful, they should not be substitutes for analytical reasoning, as results maybe be confusing, ineffective, 97 and serious mistakes may be made. 98 Nevertheless, Newey J found that shadow directors owe a fiduciary duty of good faith and loyalty to the company, given that shadow directors should reasonably be expected to act in the company's interests rather than their own.
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The decision in Vivendi is arguably a step in the right direction in that shadow directors are found to be fiduciaries, but unfortunately theoretical and practical difficulties still remain. The 'undertaking' test alone was still insufficient to conclusively identify fiduciary obligations, which is perhaps unsurprising given that even Edelman has subsequently suggested that an objective undertaking is a necessary yet not sufficient basis for imposing fiduciary duties. 100 Furthermore, supplementing the undertaking test with an analogical approach, as happened in Vivendi, seems just a problematic as using the property-based justification deployed in Ultraframe. Whilst a number of the other potential justifications, both reductivist and instrumentalist, could be applied by the courts to the shadow director question, criticism of these justifications suggests that they too would be inadequate.
THE 'POWER AND DISCRETION' TEST
The proposal is that a better theoretical basis for identifying shadow directors as fiduciaries could be achieved by introducing the Canadian 'power and discretion test' into English law, given that it better illuminates the essential elements of a relationship that compels the imposition of fiduciary duties, 101 as well as having a strong theoretical justification via Paul Miller's 'fiduciary powers theory'. 102 Miller argues that a fiduciary relationship is a distinctive and coherent type of legal relationship that can be defined as, 'one in which one party (the fiduciary) exercises discretionary power over the significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary).' 103 In dissecting this definition, Miller identified definitive properties which delimit the types of relationship identified by the definition, and structural properties which identify implications of a particular relationship for the parties concerned. 104 According to Miller, the key definitive property of fiduciary relationships is power, and having identified the definitional problems associated with the concept, 105 he proceeds to identify a new fiduciary form of power. He argues that 'fiduciary power' is unique by virtue of the fact that the fiduciary acts as a substitute in exercising a legal capacity, which derives from the principal's legal personality. 106 Miller also argues that due to its source, fiduciary power is expressly devoted to serving the practical interests of the other, which represents another key definitive property of the 'fiduciary powers theory'. 107 Beyond this, Miller identifies the three structural properties of this theory as inequality, dependence and vulnerability. Inequality typifies fiduciary relations due to unequal levels of fiduciary power within the relationship, which exists independently of 'any circumstantial inequality' that might exist between the parties. So the principal is always subordinate within the fiduciary relationship, despite being potentially ascendant in every other aspect. Both dependence and vulnerability are, according to Miller, reflective of the 'structural inequality generated by the formation of a fiduciary relationship'. (1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or power.
(2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests. power is not a wrong in itself, 114 as the fiduciary will require such power to function as a substitute for the principal, but crucially it must only be used for the given purpose. 115 In terms of application of this principle to shadow directors, it is clear that the shadow director has scope to exercise both power and discretion over at least a proportion, and indeed possibly all, of the decisions of the board of directors, therefore shadow directors have the requisite scope for the exercise of some discretion or power. The second requirement, that 'a fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical interests', is also important. 116 Without leeway or discretion, as Weinrib states, 'there is nothing on which the fiduciary obligation can bite', 117 but the danger is that the power will be misused to injure the principal rather than benefitting him. 118 The phrase 'legal or practical interests' is also crucial, since it allows fiduciary obligations to extended beyond mere financial or property interests, and emphasises that, for example, company directors' duties extend to other interests such as the general financial wellbeing of the corporation, and possibly to intangible interests such as the corporations' public image and reputation. 119 Given that a shadow director by definition possesses similar power and control to a de jure director, it is unproblematic to conclude that a shadow director will fulfil this second requirement.
The third, and arguably the most important, requirement that the 'beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power', is possibly the most difficult of the three principles to apply to shadow directors. Wilson J in Frame v Smith defined vulnerability as 'the inability of the beneficiary (despite his or her best efforts) to prevent the injurious exercise of the power or discretion combined with the grave inadequacy or absence of other legal or practical remedies to re-dress the wrongful exercise of the discretion or power'. 120 He also suggested that fiduciary obligations were seldom present in the dealings of experienced businessmen, since any vulnerability could have been prevented by a more prudent exercise of bargaining power. 121 should be assessed according to the position of the parties resulting from the agreement, rather than their relative positions prior to the agreement. So in fact the key question is whether the vulnerability arises from the relationship itself. 124 In terms of assessing vulnerability, Frankel suggests that the level of risk of abuse of power, will depend upon the amount and extent of the power delegated to the fiduciary, along with the availability of protective mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of abuse.
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Given that the de jure directors have generally delegated significant amounts of power to the shadow director, and whilst the de jure director could intervene, the reality is that the company as a whole is highly vulnerable to the power wielded by the shadow director. Consequently this requirement, and indeed all other requirements of the 'power and discretion' test, are fulfilled, providing a strong indication that shadow directors ought to owe fiduciary duties.
One potential concern is that in Canada the concept of a fiduciary relationship has been widely extended to other professional relationships, such as doctor-patient, 126 whilst such a widening of the definition of fiduciary would be possible if the English courts so wished, it would not be a definite effect of applying the power and discretion test.
A DUAL TEST FOR FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS
Although the 'power and discretion' test does help clearly identify fiduciary relationships, a number of criticisms have arisen of the test on the basis that many relationships protected by contract and negligence liability, also fulfil all of these characteristics. Such conflicts have been resolved by emphasising the strength of the vulnerability, 129 or the requirement to identify 'total reliance', in fiduciary relationships, 130 but it is submitted that such problems can be avoided by using the 'undertaking' test as well as the 'power and discretion' test. 131 The undertaking requirement has also been recently reemphasised in Canada by McLachlin CJC in
Elder Advocates of Alberta Society v Alberta. 132 The judge found that the 'power and discretion' test alone is not a complete code for the identification of fiduciary duties, 133 and that an undertaking must be identified, 134 alongside two other further requirements. 135 139 The test for finding an undertaking is discussed in some detail in this latter case. According to Cromwell J in Perez v Galambos, Canadian law requires an undertaking by a fiduciary that may result from, 'statutory powers, the express or implied terms of an agreement or, perhaps simply an undertaking to act in this way.' He further suggested that the key question was whether there was some form of undertaking, whether express or implied, on the part of the fiduciary to act with loyalty. 140 Having noted the academic support for such a requirement, 141 Cromwell J identified that an express undertaking was not necessarily required, since the undertaking might 'be implied by the particular circumstances of the parties' relationship'. He suggested that relevant factors
for establishing an implied undertaking should include 'professional norms, industry or other common prescribed have undertaken to be shadow directors. Whether being a shadow director constitutes a fiduciary relationship with the company then becomes a matter of deploying the 'power and discretion test', as described above. Thus the courts would have much clearer guidance on both the reasons for shadow directors being fiduciaries and, if the dual test is deployed more widely, greater guidance on interpreting and identifying fiduciary relationships generally.
CONCLUSION
The shadow director holds a powerful position in relation to the affairs of the company. She has power and control in one or more, or even all, areas of corporate management that, for whatever reason, the other de jure or de facto directors have been unable to resist. She can legitimately be described as the controller of the company, with powers perhaps analogous to or even exceeding that of a de jure director, yet somehow doubts have pervaded English law about the fiduciary status of the relationship shadow director. This is largely due to the lack of a sufficiently principled basis for determining whether the company-shadow director relationship is fiduciary in nature, the lack of which is perhaps unsurprising given that genuine potential additions to the 'settled category' list of fiduciary relationships have arisen relatively rarely.
It has been shown that whilst the 'undertaking' test alone can possibly be deployed successfully to demonstrate that shadow directors ought to have fiduciary duties to the company, the test itself is not a complete solution for identifying fiduciary relationships. Due to the incomplete nature of the 'undertaking' test, the courts have struggled to make consistent decisions about the fiduciary status of shadow directors, and this has not been aided by the deployment of a variety of different justifications for fiduciary duties and relationship. It has been argued here that such problems can be avoided in future by deploying the 'power and discretion' test alongside the 'undertaking' test. It is also possible that the combined approach of using both the 'undertaking' and 'power and discretion' tests could be deployed for the identification of fiduciary relationships generally, and thus provide a clear practical, and theoretically sound justification, for the implication of fiduciary duties.
While the proposed approach is somewhat more formulaic then the approach currently deployed by the courts, in that key elements of fiduciary relationships are clearly identified, nevertheless a certain level of flexibility will continue to exist in the recognition of fiduciary relationships. So hopefully this formulation offers a more principled application for finding fiduciary relationships, without realising Shepherd's fear that such a definition might damage the fiduciary concept, by robbing it 'of its dynamics and therefore its soul'. 143 The proposed formulation offers a good balance between certainty of application and respect for the equitable nature of the fiduciary doctrine, 144 and certainly avoids being too narrow, 145 although potentially does allow the concept of fiduciary to expand far beyond the traditionally-accepted categories. It is important that the 'power and discretion' test is implemented in England without developing a, 'fiduciary relationships industry', 146 or having only
